Song: Policy Address on Kosovo
Viewed: 43 - Published at: 8 years ago
Artist: Secretary of State Madeleine
Year: 2013Viewed: 43 - Published at: 8 years ago
Thank you very much for that introduction. Also, it's so nice to see so many friends in the audience. I thank you all for gathering on such short notice to talk about the changing situation in Kosovo.
Some of what I have to say will be very familiar to many of you, who have spent much of your professional lives working on the Balkans. I thank you for your dedication and your indulgence this morning. For where American interests and values are at stake, the American people deserve a full explanation of our policy. And, as we prepare to open a diplomatic conference in Rambouillet, France, and discuss at home America's possible role in implementing a peace settlement, we need to answer as many times as necessary some very logical questions, such as where is this place Kosovo, and why does it matter?
Twice before in this century, American soldiers in huge numbers have been drawn to Europe to fight wars that either began in the Balkans or that sparked bitter fighting there. After World War I, America withdrew from Europe and ignored the storm that was gathering. An entire generation of brave Europeans and Americans paid the price.
After World War II, we had learned our lesson. We stayed and helped Western Europe build peace, prosperity and freedom beyond anything its people had known before. As a result, our own nation prospered as well and stood secure in liberty.
Now that the Cold War is over, we have the opportunity to extend those blessings to the rest of Europe, including the Balkans. And we have learned that we cannot hope to guarantee these benefits for ourselves if others do not have them as well. That is why we work to bring the nations of the world closer together around fundamental principles of democracy and law, open markets and a commitment to peace. And that is why it matters when a place like Kosovo falls victim to turbulence and bloodshed.
Kosovo is a region of Yugoslavia, about the size of Connecticut. Most of its people are ethnic Albanians, and most are Muslim. But Serbs view this region -- poor, even by Balkan standards -- as the cradle of their national heritage.
Yugoslavia's collapse and descent into violence and brutality began in Kosovo. It was by proclaiming Serbia's right to supreme authority there that Slobodan Milosevic burnished his ultra-nationalist credentials and began his rise to power. And one of his first acts as President of Serbia, in 1989, was to strip Kosovo of the autonomy it had enjoyed under the Yugoslav Constitution.
His policies of ethnic polarization and hate-mongering in Kosovo ushered in a decade of police repression and human rights abuses throughout Yugoslavia. Those policies led to the breakup of Yugoslavia and to the devastating conflict in Bosnia.
For ten years, Kosovo's Albanian population fought a courageous, non-violent campaign to regain the rights they had lost. They earned the admiration of the world and the attention of successive US Administrations. In 1992, recognizing the stakes involved, President Bush issued what has become known as the "Christmas warning" -- a private but forceful message to President Milosevic not to use force against the civilian population of Kosovo.
But about one year ago, President Milosevic upped the ante by launching a brutal crackdown. Police and military forces were sent in to terrorize civilians, killing hundreds and driving hundreds of thousands from their homes. Under these conditions, many Kosovars abandoned non-violence and threw their support to the Kosovo Liberation Army, although its tactics too were sometimes brutal and indiscriminate.
The KLA, as it is known, offers a deceptively simple answer to the tragedy of Kosovo -- independence from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. But there is no guarantee that independence would lead to peace in Kosovo, and ample reason to fear that it could undermine stability elsewhere in the region. The best answer is for Kosovo, and all of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, to adhere to international standards of human rights for everyone, regardless of ethnicity.
Last fall the region reached crisis, with hundreds of thousands of civilians stranded in the hills and a steady succession of battles and killings. With diplomacy backed by the threat of NATO air strikes, we reached an agreement that averted a humanitarian crisis, slowed the violence and removed some Serb forces from the region. And we put a 1,000-person OSCE mission on the ground.
Unfortunately, neither the Serbs nor the Kosovo Albanians have ever fully met their obligations. Today the region is again on the verge of massive violence and a human tragedy of immense proportions.
It may not be immediately apparent that the brutal policies of one local leader, and the tragedy of one small people, matter so much that they affect fundamental American interests. But they do.
America has a fundamental interest in peace and stability in Southern Europe, and in seeing that the institutions which keep the peace across that continent are strengthened. America has a fundamental interest in preserving Bosnia's progress toward peace, for which our soldiers, diplomats and humanitarian workers have given so much -- and which would be seriously jeopardized by renewed violence in nearby Kosovo. America has a fundamental interest in strengthening democratic principles and practices in the Balkans and throughout Europe. Developing a real democracy in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is crucial. And America has a fundamental interest in seeing the rule of law upheld, human rights protected and justice done.
We must never forget that there is no natural boundary to violence in Southern Europe. Spreading conflict could re-ignite fighting in neighboring Albania and destabilize fragile Macedonia. It could affect our NATO allies, Greece and Turkey. And it could flood the region with refugees and create a haven for international terrorists, drug traffickers and criminals.
Regional conflict would undermine NATO's credibility as the guarantor of peace and stability in Europe. This would pose a threat that America could not ignore.
A great deal has been written and said about Kosovo as another Bosnia. But Kosovo is not Bosnia -- for a host of political, geographic and historical reasons.
Most importantly, Kosovo is not Bosnia because we have learned the lessons of Bosnia -- and we are determined to apply them here and now. We know -- and we are seeing again -- that the only reward for tolerating atrocities is more of the same. The killings of 45 people in Racak last month provide more fuel to the fires of violence, which have caused 45,000 people to flee their villages in the past six weeks.
We know that the longer we delay in exercising our leadership, the dearer it will eventually be -- in dollars lost, in lost credibility and in human lives. Simply put, we learned in Bosnia that we can pay early, or we can pay much more later.
Finally, we learned in Bosnia, and we have seen in Kosovo, that President Milosevic understands only the language of force. Nothing less than strong engagement from NATO will focus the attention of both sides; and nothing less than firm American leadership will ensure decisive action.
That is why the United States has led the way in NATO and in the Contact Group to build momentum for a political settlement. In London last Friday, my Contact Group colleagues and I put forward a comprehensive plan to end the fighting and to move on to the difficult business of building a future. We told both sides that we expect full compliance with the relevant Security Council resolutions.
Belgrade must put an end to offensive operations and give its full support to the Kosovo Verification Mission and the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia. Belgrade must ensure that those responsible for the Racak massacre are brought to justice or turned over to the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia if that body so requests.
The Kosovo Liberation Army must refrain from provocations. And both sides were told in no uncertain terms that they must protect civilian populations and facilitate the work of humanitarian organizations.
The Contact Group also set out a timetable for concluding an interim political agreement. Representatives from Belgrade and Kosovo will open talks this Saturday in Rambouillet, France, under the chairmanship of British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook and French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine.
Leaders of all Kosovo Albanian factions have already accepted. We have had positive indications from Belgrade this morning. President Milosevic knows we expect full participation; and I believe we will get it.
These will not be conventional negotiations, and they will not be easy. We will offer the parties the chance to meet together. But we expect that this will be a week of intense diplomacy by our negotiators -- American Ambassador Chris Hill, European Union envoy Wolfgang Petritsch and a Russian representative, whom we understand will be Boris Mayorskiy.
And we expect that the parties will accept the draft interim agreement to be put forward by the Contact Group. Our approach is based on months of painstaking shuttle diplomacy by Ambassadors Hill and Petritsch. Many of you are familiar with the thrust of our ideas, so let me touch only briefly on the principles behind it.
The core of what we are proposing has not changed and will not. We aim to put in place a durable and fair interim agreement that will create a peaceful political framework for Kosovo while deferring the question of Kosovo's status for several years.
The people of Kosovo must be able to govern themselves democratically without interference from Belgrade while the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's territorial integrity and sovereignty are maintained. And they must possess all the institutions a democratic government requires, from a legislature and an independent judiciary to a locally controlled police force.
All the ethnic groups of Kosovo, of which there are several in addition to Albanians and Serbs, must be treated fairly. They must be able to control, without government interference, their identities and cultural life. And the rights of individuals of all ethnicities must be fully protected. The right to nourish and promote culture and identity is at the heart of many of the problems in the Balkans.
Finally, to ensure that these principles take effect, authority should devolve as much as possible to local communities so that they have the authority to resolve problems themselves.
We do not expect to resolve all the long-standing and deeply-held grievances of both sides. Rather, we seek to build a climate in which the people of Kosovo receive the rights and security they have been denied, and in which Belgrade has a chance to show that Kosovo can prosper within its borders over a three-year interim period.
We expect the parties to finish the talks within seven days, or satisfy the Contact Group that significant progress is being made to warrant an extension. At the end of that time, three outcomes are possible. If President Milosevic refuses to accept the Contact Group proposals, or has allowed repression in Kosovo to continue, he can expect NATO air strikes. If the Kosovo Albanians obstruct progress at Rambouillet or on the ground, they cannot expect the NATO and the international community to bail them out. Decisions on air strikes and international support will be affected, and we will find additional ways of bringing pressure to bear. If the two sides do reach agreement, we will need to concentrate our efforts on making sure that it is successfully implemented.
There should be no doubt on either side that the consequences of failure to reach agreement or to show restraint on the ground will be swift and severe.
Last Saturday, NATO gave its full support to this approach by warning that Secretary General Solana, after consulting with the United States and other NATO allies, can and will authorize strikes on the territory of the FRY if the demands laid out by NATO and the Contact Group are not met. United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan, too, has lent his full support.
This reflects a general recognition that we have reached the stage where diplomacy, to succeed, requires the backing of military force. And it reflects wide agreement that NATO successfully acted beyond its borders in Bosnia to bring a deadly conflict to an end, and that it can do this again in Kosovo. No one believes NATO should fight a war, but rather that under the right circumstances, deployment of a NATO-led peacekeeping force may give lasting peace a chance to develop. And as in Bosnia, American leadership is needed to set progress in motion, and make peace a real possibility.
During the last few days, Administration officials, including myself, have been consulting with leaders in Congress on the dangers of allowing the situation in Kosovo to fester, and on our indispensable role in helping to resolve it. This morning, President Clinton announced that we are seriously considering the possibility of American participation in a NATO-led peace implementation force for Kosovo.
America has clear national interests at stake in a peaceful resolution of this conflict, which create compelling reasons for us to consider seriously American participation. However, our willingness to participate will depend on achieving a strong and effective agreement to which the parties show that they are genuinely committed. The force must be able to operate in a permissive environment, including the withdrawal of a sufficient number of Serb security forces and an agreement restricting paramilitary weapons and operations.
We must agree with our NATO allies on a clearly defined and achievable mission -- one where our contribution would be no more than several thousand troops, while our European allies provide the lion's share.
At the same time, we must recognize that some US participation is desired and expected by our allies, and may be essential to securing the confidence of the parties.
I am pleased to say that Europe has already shown willingness to take on a great deal of the burden in Kosovo. Britain, France and other allies have already pledged to provide the bulk of a post-settlement force. Thirty-seven countries have sent verifiers to the OSCE mission. Russia has pledged its partnership in ending the war and securing the peace and is providing, as I said, a senior negotiator for the talks at Rambouillet.
One of the best outcomes of our experience in Bosnia has been the understanding, trust and partnership that developed between Russia and its colleagues in the field, at the negotiating table and even at NATO. Each participating country has gained from Bosnia a broader sense of its own national interests and a shared stake in achieving a common sense of security in Europe. And certainly, we would welcome any decision by Russia to participate in a Kosovo peace implementation force.
Often, I like to end my speeches on an optimistic note. Those who know me know that is my nature, and it usually makes for better rhetoric. In contemplating the current situation in Kosovo, however, I believe it may be more fitting to quote the self-assessment of Vaclav Havel:
"I am not the optimist because I am not sure that everything ends well. Nor am I a pessimist, because I am not sure everything ends badly. Instead, I am a realist who carries hope, and hope is the belief that freedom and justice have meaning."
There is a great deal at stake in Kosovo today for the people of that region, for the future of security cooperation in Europe and for all who believe in the principles of tolerance, respect for human rights and adherence to the rule of law.
We do not underestimate the difficulties or the risks of achieving a settlement that is lasting and fair. We cannot succeed if the parties refuse to live up to their own responsibilities. But we would not be meeting our own responsibility to them or to ourselves if we do not do what we could to lead the way.
Thank you very much.
SPEAKER: Thank you, Madame Secretary, for your remarks, for your commitment, but above all, for your leadership for decisive resolution and a peaceful resolution.
The Secretary will now take questions. We ask that you identify yourself; that you be brief; that they truly be questions and not statements. We will not allow follow-up questions, due to the constraints of time.
We regret that we do not have microphones. So what we're going to ask you to do is to speak as loudly as you can. If need be for the cameras, we will repeat questions. But I think this is a small enough room. So I will identify the questions.
Q: The number of troops on the ground that might be useful for this environment of NATO might not be the same number of troops that create -- (inaudible) -- civilians. We're very concerned about any number of -- (inaudible) -- military remaining in Kosovo. We very much want to see all of them out and NATO in. I'm just wondering about the timeline for that. I'm also wondering about whether the numbers in the actual agreement are solid, or whether Milosevic gets to jack them up and then not comply. Thank you.
SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Thank you. Well, obviously this is an issue that is of concern. As I've said, the NATO force would be a peace implementation force going into a permissive environment. What we are working out now, in the annex to the draft principles here, is a way to get the forces out in a sustained way so that what can happen during this interim period is that the OSCE mission can continue to do its work. The whole thing would be internationally supervised. And that the local police, which is part of what is supposed to be happening during this interim agreement, can begin to take hold so that ultimately this is an area that would be controlled by the local police that would then be under the control of the new, interim self-government.
So these are part of the talks that are going to go on, not to be determined by the parties but by the exigencies of moving this forward. I think it's important to us to ultimately have them out.
Q: (Inaudible) -- I was very pleased to hear your comments -- (inaudible) -- what my prime concern is that this agreement -- (inaudible) -- Milosevic to cover greater oppression with his media, opposition parties? And will the US guarantee that -- (inaudible) --
SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Well, I think that we have been very concerned about what has been going on in Serbia, and concerned -- I have to say, personally, I am depressed about the fact that there has not been enough opposition activity. I used to say, -- (inaudible) -- is not. They never could get together to be -- (inaudible).
I think that the issues here are to try to do what we can to make sure that there is free media, that it is possible for oppositions to exist. I think it is very hard for us to guarantee something like that. But it is certainly our principles that we believe that there needs to be an opening up of Serbian society.
Q: Madame Secretary, are you willing to consider independence for Kosovo at the end of this durable interim agreement, provided that could be accomplished --
SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: I think that the important point here now is that we're not asking people to give up their dreams, as Ambassador Hill has said. But it is very important for them to focus on this interim period and to build what I think as a -- I guess once you're a political scientist, you're always a political scientist -- what I would consider a very high degree of self-autonomy.
I think that as people begin to see the various details of this agreement, the fact that there would be a president and an assembly and an independent judiciary and power devolved to the community local level, to the creation of local police and a whole host of local units, that this is a lot more self-government than I think most people are aware of.
I think that there is a question about what independence ultimately would lead to, as I stated in my remarks, and whether, in fact, it creates different pressures in the Balkan region that would have a destabilizing effect. But I think the most important point here -- and what we are focusing the parties on -- is to concentrate on this three-year interim period and let democratic institutions sink their roots into the soil of Kosovo.
Q: Madame Secretary, the resolution passed by the Serbian parliament today came out against any deployment of any kind of NATO force, irrespective of agreement or no agreement on Kosovo. There seems to be an effort to create a bargaining chip. If it is, and the price is lifting the outer wall of sanctions, how will you go forward with that particular --
SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Well, I think this is not the time to be talking about bargaining chips. I think that they need to come to the table. There will be a draft put forward. I think that it's very important -- a NATO implementation force is part of the deal. I think that it's very important to be able to have a NATO force in there to be able to implement this.
I think that I guess it's not unexpected that the Serbs would be trying to make bargains like that. But the bottom line here is that it is important for them to come to the table, to focus on the fact that there is a viable interim agreement on the table and to be prepared to have a negotiation in good faith.
Q: (Inaudible) -- 2,500 Serb police 1,800 Yugoslav army on the ground -- (inaudible) -- is that a negotiable figure, up or down or is this -- (inaudible) --
SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: I think it's unwise for me to go into the details of what is going to be presented to the parties. They are going to be presented a text that they can agree on, or on other things that they might agree on mutually. But basically, this is a text that they know -- they're actually very familiar with it, as you are.
Because Ambassador Hill, I think, has done a magnificent job of going back and forth and familiarizing them with the text. I think that it's important. It will be presented as the basis, and that is what we expect the agreement to be; except where the two parties might agree on some other aspect of it.
Q: Madame Secretary, I wonder if you could elaborate on the role of -- (inaudible) -- elections and -- (inaudible) -- envisaged in the pre-election period -- (inaudible) --
SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Well, first of all, I think that the role that the OSCE is taking in Kosovo is very important -- not only for Kosovo, but frankly for the OSCE. I think that they have taken upon themselves, at the request of the international community, a wholly different role in terms of this monitoring that is much larger than something that they have done before.
They have, however, done elections before; and they will be the ones that will be instrumental in getting the election procedures into place and then supervising them and then, obviously, getting monitors from various other places.
It is our hope that organizations such as the National Democratic Institute and the IRI -- the Republican Institute -- will also be able to lend the kind of assistance that they have done so very well in areas also. Because I think that we have generally found that a variety of organizations can help in the election process. As we also all have learned, it is not just the day of election, but the getting ready for the election and the whole process that guarantees that they are free, fair and open.
Q: I'm a hopeful realist myself, but I can't help believe that Mr. Milosevic will regard our threats of force much more seriously if we withdrew temporarily the civilian monitors that are out there on the ground in Kosovo and whose presence makes it unlikely that we were going to bomb; and insisted that he attend the negotiations too, so the deals can actually be cut there. Would you support that?
SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Well, I think that what we have to -- I think it's important to get these negotiations started with the team that is coming. Obviously, you have to understand that Milosevic is ultimately the person who will say yes or no, whether he's there or whether he's sitting in Belgrade.
Q: (Inaudible) -- monitors?
SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Well, I think that's a military question that I'm not going to go into.
Q: A follow-up to that question, then, does that mean that mean that the United States expects Slobodan Milosevic to participate directly in the conference this weekend? And if so, does that mean he will be -- (inaudible) -- of the agreement yet again?
SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Well, first of all, I think that he is, for better or worse, the President and the one that ultimately has to -- if he does not give his approval to it, it is difficult to imagine that there is an agreement.
I think this is one of the unfortunate paradoxes of this whole situation. I don't think there is any American that enjoys dealing with Milosevic, or does not have an opinion of him that is not favorable.
I think that, however, he is the address in Belgrade. I think that we have to deal with who is there and have to make clear to him that there are grave consequences with either not being a part of this -- either physically or by virtue of e-mail or however they communicate -- or not abiding by an agreement if it is ultimately made.
The bottom line of this agreement is that the two parties have to agree to it and then that the NATO implementing force would be there in a permissive environment. Those are all the parts of it.
Q: If the Serbs send Mr. Vovodovich as the head of their delegation, will the United States and the others recognize him -- The Montenegrins say he's an unconstitutional -- (inaudible) -- And the second question is very long range. Up on the Hill you hear questions about how to leave Kosovo, what is the exit strategy? How do you avoid this turning into a -- (inaudible) --
SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: First of all, I think that we do not yet have the final composition of the Serbian side. So I don't want to comment on who or what shows up and how that is composed.
I didn't mean the what.
I guess I did.
Let me just say this -- on the exit strategy, I think that we have learned a very important lesson out of Bosnia. That is that setting deadlines in terms of dates is often not productive. Therefore, what we want to do here is to be more concerned about benchmarks -- whether certain benchmarks have been achieved, such as the creation of the local police or the election process, the various parts of this agreement that need to be carried out.
So we have been on the Hill, and I must say that the members there asked serious and good questions -- the kinds of questions that are the kinds that we have asked ourselves. Those consultations, I think, have gone well. One of the questions has been exactly the one you asked. So we have made very clear that we are going to be looking at benchmarks to decide how long. But it's not an open-ended commitment, obviously.
Q: Madame Secretary, do you anticipate the peace-keeping force would have to remain through the entire three-year period? And if you do, aren't they likely to be caught up in the inevitable push for independence that you yourself just said could be a condition of instability?
SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Well, I think --
Q: Will Americans get caught up in the KLA and others, trying to separate Kosovo from Yugoslavia?
SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Barry, I think usually we have you first; it's very odd to end up.
I think the issue here, as I said to Roy, I think that the point is that we will be looking at benchmarks. It's hard to say whether they'll be there a shorter period. I think those are premature questions at the moment. We're obviously going to be dealing with all of that.
The point here is that throughout all of this, there has to be a permissive environment. If, for some reason -- not necessarily the one you raised -- or for any reason, if there is a complete breakdown in all of this and the agreement is not being carried out, the forces would leave. I think that it has to be very clear that this is an implementation force that has to be -- whose mandate is one to operate in a permissive environment, and not one where a fighting struggle is going on.
Q: Well, the President today said there has to be an exit strategy. I assume, by what you're saying, that's something you're still thinking about, what the strategy would involve.
SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: It's these benchmarks, Barry. I mean, I think that the exit strategy will be based on a set of benchmarks, the kinds of which I was suggesting to you. They will be more specific.
SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Thank you. Let me thank all of you, very much, again for having come together so quickly and for asking such great questions; and also for all the great thinking that has gone on on a problem that I think is particularly difficult and will require everybody's help and attention.
Thank you.
Some of what I have to say will be very familiar to many of you, who have spent much of your professional lives working on the Balkans. I thank you for your dedication and your indulgence this morning. For where American interests and values are at stake, the American people deserve a full explanation of our policy. And, as we prepare to open a diplomatic conference in Rambouillet, France, and discuss at home America's possible role in implementing a peace settlement, we need to answer as many times as necessary some very logical questions, such as where is this place Kosovo, and why does it matter?
Twice before in this century, American soldiers in huge numbers have been drawn to Europe to fight wars that either began in the Balkans or that sparked bitter fighting there. After World War I, America withdrew from Europe and ignored the storm that was gathering. An entire generation of brave Europeans and Americans paid the price.
After World War II, we had learned our lesson. We stayed and helped Western Europe build peace, prosperity and freedom beyond anything its people had known before. As a result, our own nation prospered as well and stood secure in liberty.
Now that the Cold War is over, we have the opportunity to extend those blessings to the rest of Europe, including the Balkans. And we have learned that we cannot hope to guarantee these benefits for ourselves if others do not have them as well. That is why we work to bring the nations of the world closer together around fundamental principles of democracy and law, open markets and a commitment to peace. And that is why it matters when a place like Kosovo falls victim to turbulence and bloodshed.
Kosovo is a region of Yugoslavia, about the size of Connecticut. Most of its people are ethnic Albanians, and most are Muslim. But Serbs view this region -- poor, even by Balkan standards -- as the cradle of their national heritage.
Yugoslavia's collapse and descent into violence and brutality began in Kosovo. It was by proclaiming Serbia's right to supreme authority there that Slobodan Milosevic burnished his ultra-nationalist credentials and began his rise to power. And one of his first acts as President of Serbia, in 1989, was to strip Kosovo of the autonomy it had enjoyed under the Yugoslav Constitution.
His policies of ethnic polarization and hate-mongering in Kosovo ushered in a decade of police repression and human rights abuses throughout Yugoslavia. Those policies led to the breakup of Yugoslavia and to the devastating conflict in Bosnia.
For ten years, Kosovo's Albanian population fought a courageous, non-violent campaign to regain the rights they had lost. They earned the admiration of the world and the attention of successive US Administrations. In 1992, recognizing the stakes involved, President Bush issued what has become known as the "Christmas warning" -- a private but forceful message to President Milosevic not to use force against the civilian population of Kosovo.
But about one year ago, President Milosevic upped the ante by launching a brutal crackdown. Police and military forces were sent in to terrorize civilians, killing hundreds and driving hundreds of thousands from their homes. Under these conditions, many Kosovars abandoned non-violence and threw their support to the Kosovo Liberation Army, although its tactics too were sometimes brutal and indiscriminate.
The KLA, as it is known, offers a deceptively simple answer to the tragedy of Kosovo -- independence from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. But there is no guarantee that independence would lead to peace in Kosovo, and ample reason to fear that it could undermine stability elsewhere in the region. The best answer is for Kosovo, and all of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, to adhere to international standards of human rights for everyone, regardless of ethnicity.
Last fall the region reached crisis, with hundreds of thousands of civilians stranded in the hills and a steady succession of battles and killings. With diplomacy backed by the threat of NATO air strikes, we reached an agreement that averted a humanitarian crisis, slowed the violence and removed some Serb forces from the region. And we put a 1,000-person OSCE mission on the ground.
Unfortunately, neither the Serbs nor the Kosovo Albanians have ever fully met their obligations. Today the region is again on the verge of massive violence and a human tragedy of immense proportions.
It may not be immediately apparent that the brutal policies of one local leader, and the tragedy of one small people, matter so much that they affect fundamental American interests. But they do.
America has a fundamental interest in peace and stability in Southern Europe, and in seeing that the institutions which keep the peace across that continent are strengthened. America has a fundamental interest in preserving Bosnia's progress toward peace, for which our soldiers, diplomats and humanitarian workers have given so much -- and which would be seriously jeopardized by renewed violence in nearby Kosovo. America has a fundamental interest in strengthening democratic principles and practices in the Balkans and throughout Europe. Developing a real democracy in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is crucial. And America has a fundamental interest in seeing the rule of law upheld, human rights protected and justice done.
We must never forget that there is no natural boundary to violence in Southern Europe. Spreading conflict could re-ignite fighting in neighboring Albania and destabilize fragile Macedonia. It could affect our NATO allies, Greece and Turkey. And it could flood the region with refugees and create a haven for international terrorists, drug traffickers and criminals.
Regional conflict would undermine NATO's credibility as the guarantor of peace and stability in Europe. This would pose a threat that America could not ignore.
A great deal has been written and said about Kosovo as another Bosnia. But Kosovo is not Bosnia -- for a host of political, geographic and historical reasons.
Most importantly, Kosovo is not Bosnia because we have learned the lessons of Bosnia -- and we are determined to apply them here and now. We know -- and we are seeing again -- that the only reward for tolerating atrocities is more of the same. The killings of 45 people in Racak last month provide more fuel to the fires of violence, which have caused 45,000 people to flee their villages in the past six weeks.
We know that the longer we delay in exercising our leadership, the dearer it will eventually be -- in dollars lost, in lost credibility and in human lives. Simply put, we learned in Bosnia that we can pay early, or we can pay much more later.
Finally, we learned in Bosnia, and we have seen in Kosovo, that President Milosevic understands only the language of force. Nothing less than strong engagement from NATO will focus the attention of both sides; and nothing less than firm American leadership will ensure decisive action.
That is why the United States has led the way in NATO and in the Contact Group to build momentum for a political settlement. In London last Friday, my Contact Group colleagues and I put forward a comprehensive plan to end the fighting and to move on to the difficult business of building a future. We told both sides that we expect full compliance with the relevant Security Council resolutions.
Belgrade must put an end to offensive operations and give its full support to the Kosovo Verification Mission and the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia. Belgrade must ensure that those responsible for the Racak massacre are brought to justice or turned over to the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia if that body so requests.
The Kosovo Liberation Army must refrain from provocations. And both sides were told in no uncertain terms that they must protect civilian populations and facilitate the work of humanitarian organizations.
The Contact Group also set out a timetable for concluding an interim political agreement. Representatives from Belgrade and Kosovo will open talks this Saturday in Rambouillet, France, under the chairmanship of British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook and French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine.
Leaders of all Kosovo Albanian factions have already accepted. We have had positive indications from Belgrade this morning. President Milosevic knows we expect full participation; and I believe we will get it.
These will not be conventional negotiations, and they will not be easy. We will offer the parties the chance to meet together. But we expect that this will be a week of intense diplomacy by our negotiators -- American Ambassador Chris Hill, European Union envoy Wolfgang Petritsch and a Russian representative, whom we understand will be Boris Mayorskiy.
And we expect that the parties will accept the draft interim agreement to be put forward by the Contact Group. Our approach is based on months of painstaking shuttle diplomacy by Ambassadors Hill and Petritsch. Many of you are familiar with the thrust of our ideas, so let me touch only briefly on the principles behind it.
The core of what we are proposing has not changed and will not. We aim to put in place a durable and fair interim agreement that will create a peaceful political framework for Kosovo while deferring the question of Kosovo's status for several years.
The people of Kosovo must be able to govern themselves democratically without interference from Belgrade while the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's territorial integrity and sovereignty are maintained. And they must possess all the institutions a democratic government requires, from a legislature and an independent judiciary to a locally controlled police force.
All the ethnic groups of Kosovo, of which there are several in addition to Albanians and Serbs, must be treated fairly. They must be able to control, without government interference, their identities and cultural life. And the rights of individuals of all ethnicities must be fully protected. The right to nourish and promote culture and identity is at the heart of many of the problems in the Balkans.
Finally, to ensure that these principles take effect, authority should devolve as much as possible to local communities so that they have the authority to resolve problems themselves.
We do not expect to resolve all the long-standing and deeply-held grievances of both sides. Rather, we seek to build a climate in which the people of Kosovo receive the rights and security they have been denied, and in which Belgrade has a chance to show that Kosovo can prosper within its borders over a three-year interim period.
We expect the parties to finish the talks within seven days, or satisfy the Contact Group that significant progress is being made to warrant an extension. At the end of that time, three outcomes are possible. If President Milosevic refuses to accept the Contact Group proposals, or has allowed repression in Kosovo to continue, he can expect NATO air strikes. If the Kosovo Albanians obstruct progress at Rambouillet or on the ground, they cannot expect the NATO and the international community to bail them out. Decisions on air strikes and international support will be affected, and we will find additional ways of bringing pressure to bear. If the two sides do reach agreement, we will need to concentrate our efforts on making sure that it is successfully implemented.
There should be no doubt on either side that the consequences of failure to reach agreement or to show restraint on the ground will be swift and severe.
Last Saturday, NATO gave its full support to this approach by warning that Secretary General Solana, after consulting with the United States and other NATO allies, can and will authorize strikes on the territory of the FRY if the demands laid out by NATO and the Contact Group are not met. United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan, too, has lent his full support.
This reflects a general recognition that we have reached the stage where diplomacy, to succeed, requires the backing of military force. And it reflects wide agreement that NATO successfully acted beyond its borders in Bosnia to bring a deadly conflict to an end, and that it can do this again in Kosovo. No one believes NATO should fight a war, but rather that under the right circumstances, deployment of a NATO-led peacekeeping force may give lasting peace a chance to develop. And as in Bosnia, American leadership is needed to set progress in motion, and make peace a real possibility.
During the last few days, Administration officials, including myself, have been consulting with leaders in Congress on the dangers of allowing the situation in Kosovo to fester, and on our indispensable role in helping to resolve it. This morning, President Clinton announced that we are seriously considering the possibility of American participation in a NATO-led peace implementation force for Kosovo.
America has clear national interests at stake in a peaceful resolution of this conflict, which create compelling reasons for us to consider seriously American participation. However, our willingness to participate will depend on achieving a strong and effective agreement to which the parties show that they are genuinely committed. The force must be able to operate in a permissive environment, including the withdrawal of a sufficient number of Serb security forces and an agreement restricting paramilitary weapons and operations.
We must agree with our NATO allies on a clearly defined and achievable mission -- one where our contribution would be no more than several thousand troops, while our European allies provide the lion's share.
At the same time, we must recognize that some US participation is desired and expected by our allies, and may be essential to securing the confidence of the parties.
I am pleased to say that Europe has already shown willingness to take on a great deal of the burden in Kosovo. Britain, France and other allies have already pledged to provide the bulk of a post-settlement force. Thirty-seven countries have sent verifiers to the OSCE mission. Russia has pledged its partnership in ending the war and securing the peace and is providing, as I said, a senior negotiator for the talks at Rambouillet.
One of the best outcomes of our experience in Bosnia has been the understanding, trust and partnership that developed between Russia and its colleagues in the field, at the negotiating table and even at NATO. Each participating country has gained from Bosnia a broader sense of its own national interests and a shared stake in achieving a common sense of security in Europe. And certainly, we would welcome any decision by Russia to participate in a Kosovo peace implementation force.
Often, I like to end my speeches on an optimistic note. Those who know me know that is my nature, and it usually makes for better rhetoric. In contemplating the current situation in Kosovo, however, I believe it may be more fitting to quote the self-assessment of Vaclav Havel:
"I am not the optimist because I am not sure that everything ends well. Nor am I a pessimist, because I am not sure everything ends badly. Instead, I am a realist who carries hope, and hope is the belief that freedom and justice have meaning."
There is a great deal at stake in Kosovo today for the people of that region, for the future of security cooperation in Europe and for all who believe in the principles of tolerance, respect for human rights and adherence to the rule of law.
We do not underestimate the difficulties or the risks of achieving a settlement that is lasting and fair. We cannot succeed if the parties refuse to live up to their own responsibilities. But we would not be meeting our own responsibility to them or to ourselves if we do not do what we could to lead the way.
Thank you very much.
SPEAKER: Thank you, Madame Secretary, for your remarks, for your commitment, but above all, for your leadership for decisive resolution and a peaceful resolution.
The Secretary will now take questions. We ask that you identify yourself; that you be brief; that they truly be questions and not statements. We will not allow follow-up questions, due to the constraints of time.
We regret that we do not have microphones. So what we're going to ask you to do is to speak as loudly as you can. If need be for the cameras, we will repeat questions. But I think this is a small enough room. So I will identify the questions.
Q: The number of troops on the ground that might be useful for this environment of NATO might not be the same number of troops that create -- (inaudible) -- civilians. We're very concerned about any number of -- (inaudible) -- military remaining in Kosovo. We very much want to see all of them out and NATO in. I'm just wondering about the timeline for that. I'm also wondering about whether the numbers in the actual agreement are solid, or whether Milosevic gets to jack them up and then not comply. Thank you.
SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Thank you. Well, obviously this is an issue that is of concern. As I've said, the NATO force would be a peace implementation force going into a permissive environment. What we are working out now, in the annex to the draft principles here, is a way to get the forces out in a sustained way so that what can happen during this interim period is that the OSCE mission can continue to do its work. The whole thing would be internationally supervised. And that the local police, which is part of what is supposed to be happening during this interim agreement, can begin to take hold so that ultimately this is an area that would be controlled by the local police that would then be under the control of the new, interim self-government.
So these are part of the talks that are going to go on, not to be determined by the parties but by the exigencies of moving this forward. I think it's important to us to ultimately have them out.
Q: (Inaudible) -- I was very pleased to hear your comments -- (inaudible) -- what my prime concern is that this agreement -- (inaudible) -- Milosevic to cover greater oppression with his media, opposition parties? And will the US guarantee that -- (inaudible) --
SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Well, I think that we have been very concerned about what has been going on in Serbia, and concerned -- I have to say, personally, I am depressed about the fact that there has not been enough opposition activity. I used to say, -- (inaudible) -- is not. They never could get together to be -- (inaudible).
I think that the issues here are to try to do what we can to make sure that there is free media, that it is possible for oppositions to exist. I think it is very hard for us to guarantee something like that. But it is certainly our principles that we believe that there needs to be an opening up of Serbian society.
Q: Madame Secretary, are you willing to consider independence for Kosovo at the end of this durable interim agreement, provided that could be accomplished --
SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: I think that the important point here now is that we're not asking people to give up their dreams, as Ambassador Hill has said. But it is very important for them to focus on this interim period and to build what I think as a -- I guess once you're a political scientist, you're always a political scientist -- what I would consider a very high degree of self-autonomy.
I think that as people begin to see the various details of this agreement, the fact that there would be a president and an assembly and an independent judiciary and power devolved to the community local level, to the creation of local police and a whole host of local units, that this is a lot more self-government than I think most people are aware of.
I think that there is a question about what independence ultimately would lead to, as I stated in my remarks, and whether, in fact, it creates different pressures in the Balkan region that would have a destabilizing effect. But I think the most important point here -- and what we are focusing the parties on -- is to concentrate on this three-year interim period and let democratic institutions sink their roots into the soil of Kosovo.
Q: Madame Secretary, the resolution passed by the Serbian parliament today came out against any deployment of any kind of NATO force, irrespective of agreement or no agreement on Kosovo. There seems to be an effort to create a bargaining chip. If it is, and the price is lifting the outer wall of sanctions, how will you go forward with that particular --
SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Well, I think this is not the time to be talking about bargaining chips. I think that they need to come to the table. There will be a draft put forward. I think that it's very important -- a NATO implementation force is part of the deal. I think that it's very important to be able to have a NATO force in there to be able to implement this.
I think that I guess it's not unexpected that the Serbs would be trying to make bargains like that. But the bottom line here is that it is important for them to come to the table, to focus on the fact that there is a viable interim agreement on the table and to be prepared to have a negotiation in good faith.
Q: (Inaudible) -- 2,500 Serb police 1,800 Yugoslav army on the ground -- (inaudible) -- is that a negotiable figure, up or down or is this -- (inaudible) --
SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: I think it's unwise for me to go into the details of what is going to be presented to the parties. They are going to be presented a text that they can agree on, or on other things that they might agree on mutually. But basically, this is a text that they know -- they're actually very familiar with it, as you are.
Because Ambassador Hill, I think, has done a magnificent job of going back and forth and familiarizing them with the text. I think that it's important. It will be presented as the basis, and that is what we expect the agreement to be; except where the two parties might agree on some other aspect of it.
Q: Madame Secretary, I wonder if you could elaborate on the role of -- (inaudible) -- elections and -- (inaudible) -- envisaged in the pre-election period -- (inaudible) --
SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Well, first of all, I think that the role that the OSCE is taking in Kosovo is very important -- not only for Kosovo, but frankly for the OSCE. I think that they have taken upon themselves, at the request of the international community, a wholly different role in terms of this monitoring that is much larger than something that they have done before.
They have, however, done elections before; and they will be the ones that will be instrumental in getting the election procedures into place and then supervising them and then, obviously, getting monitors from various other places.
It is our hope that organizations such as the National Democratic Institute and the IRI -- the Republican Institute -- will also be able to lend the kind of assistance that they have done so very well in areas also. Because I think that we have generally found that a variety of organizations can help in the election process. As we also all have learned, it is not just the day of election, but the getting ready for the election and the whole process that guarantees that they are free, fair and open.
Q: I'm a hopeful realist myself, but I can't help believe that Mr. Milosevic will regard our threats of force much more seriously if we withdrew temporarily the civilian monitors that are out there on the ground in Kosovo and whose presence makes it unlikely that we were going to bomb; and insisted that he attend the negotiations too, so the deals can actually be cut there. Would you support that?
SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Well, I think that what we have to -- I think it's important to get these negotiations started with the team that is coming. Obviously, you have to understand that Milosevic is ultimately the person who will say yes or no, whether he's there or whether he's sitting in Belgrade.
Q: (Inaudible) -- monitors?
SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Well, I think that's a military question that I'm not going to go into.
Q: A follow-up to that question, then, does that mean that mean that the United States expects Slobodan Milosevic to participate directly in the conference this weekend? And if so, does that mean he will be -- (inaudible) -- of the agreement yet again?
SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Well, first of all, I think that he is, for better or worse, the President and the one that ultimately has to -- if he does not give his approval to it, it is difficult to imagine that there is an agreement.
I think this is one of the unfortunate paradoxes of this whole situation. I don't think there is any American that enjoys dealing with Milosevic, or does not have an opinion of him that is not favorable.
I think that, however, he is the address in Belgrade. I think that we have to deal with who is there and have to make clear to him that there are grave consequences with either not being a part of this -- either physically or by virtue of e-mail or however they communicate -- or not abiding by an agreement if it is ultimately made.
The bottom line of this agreement is that the two parties have to agree to it and then that the NATO implementing force would be there in a permissive environment. Those are all the parts of it.
Q: If the Serbs send Mr. Vovodovich as the head of their delegation, will the United States and the others recognize him -- The Montenegrins say he's an unconstitutional -- (inaudible) -- And the second question is very long range. Up on the Hill you hear questions about how to leave Kosovo, what is the exit strategy? How do you avoid this turning into a -- (inaudible) --
SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: First of all, I think that we do not yet have the final composition of the Serbian side. So I don't want to comment on who or what shows up and how that is composed.
I didn't mean the what.
I guess I did.
Let me just say this -- on the exit strategy, I think that we have learned a very important lesson out of Bosnia. That is that setting deadlines in terms of dates is often not productive. Therefore, what we want to do here is to be more concerned about benchmarks -- whether certain benchmarks have been achieved, such as the creation of the local police or the election process, the various parts of this agreement that need to be carried out.
So we have been on the Hill, and I must say that the members there asked serious and good questions -- the kinds of questions that are the kinds that we have asked ourselves. Those consultations, I think, have gone well. One of the questions has been exactly the one you asked. So we have made very clear that we are going to be looking at benchmarks to decide how long. But it's not an open-ended commitment, obviously.
Q: Madame Secretary, do you anticipate the peace-keeping force would have to remain through the entire three-year period? And if you do, aren't they likely to be caught up in the inevitable push for independence that you yourself just said could be a condition of instability?
SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Well, I think --
Q: Will Americans get caught up in the KLA and others, trying to separate Kosovo from Yugoslavia?
SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Barry, I think usually we have you first; it's very odd to end up.
I think the issue here, as I said to Roy, I think that the point is that we will be looking at benchmarks. It's hard to say whether they'll be there a shorter period. I think those are premature questions at the moment. We're obviously going to be dealing with all of that.
The point here is that throughout all of this, there has to be a permissive environment. If, for some reason -- not necessarily the one you raised -- or for any reason, if there is a complete breakdown in all of this and the agreement is not being carried out, the forces would leave. I think that it has to be very clear that this is an implementation force that has to be -- whose mandate is one to operate in a permissive environment, and not one where a fighting struggle is going on.
Q: Well, the President today said there has to be an exit strategy. I assume, by what you're saying, that's something you're still thinking about, what the strategy would involve.
SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: It's these benchmarks, Barry. I mean, I think that the exit strategy will be based on a set of benchmarks, the kinds of which I was suggesting to you. They will be more specific.
SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Thank you. Let me thank all of you, very much, again for having come together so quickly and for asking such great questions; and also for all the great thinking that has gone on on a problem that I think is particularly difficult and will require everybody's help and attention.
Thank you.
( Secretary of State Madeleine )
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