Song: Bird song and the problem of honest communication
Viewed: 43 - Published at: 8 years ago
Artist: William Searcy, Stephen
Year: 2013Viewed: 43 - Published at: 8 years ago
Bird Song and the Problem of Honest Communication
How is the honesty of animal signals maintained when exaggeration and bluff are so tempting?
People may at times be tempted to communicate dishonest information to one another: to exaggerate our income to someone we're dating, for example, or, conversely, to understate our income to the Internal Revenue Service. Although morality does play a role in the degree of truth imparted in the messages that we actually deliver, we also use a rational calculation of costs and benefits to decide whether or not to bend the truth. That lie may be worth it to us if the reward outweighs the punishment for getting caught— we are only human, after all.
But when animals communicate, we don't necessarily expect individuals to make decisions based on either moral standards o r societal rules. Rather, we expect the rules determining the honesty of a signal—or what researchers study- ing the topic call signal reliability to be imposed by natural selection, with costs and benefits ultimately measured in terms of relative reproductive success. How natural selection works to keep aiiimal signals reliable, and the nature of the outcome, is currently a central question in animal behavior.
Signal reliability poses a puzzle in many forms of animal communication, but the nature of tliis problem is perhaps most easily described by citing an example of aggressive signaling. Suppose two animals are vying for some resource, such as a particularly suitable nesting area, and that they are evenly matched in their fighting ability. Let's aLso assume that one of tliese two individuals values the piece of territory more and is therefore willing to fight harder to get it. If the animals resort to fighting, this more aggressive individual will win. Therefore, it seems efficient to settle the contest by signaling: Each individual conveys its true level of aggressiveness - that is, how hard it is willing to fight — and the less-aggressive individual concedes. The outcome is the same as if there had been a fight, but both individuals are spared the often painful price of an actual conflict.
This scenario sounds reasonable enough at first, except that it potentially creates a system that is vulnerable to cheating. If aggressive signals are effective in intimidating rivals, then individuals who exaggerate their aggressiveness will win contests that they would otherwise lose. Cheaters will benefit from their deception, cheating will be favored and spread in the population, and the signal will soon cease to correlate reliably with aggressiveness.
How is the honesty of animal signals maintained when exaggeration and bluff are so tempting?
People may at times be tempted to communicate dishonest information to one another: to exaggerate our income to someone we're dating, for example, or, conversely, to understate our income to the Internal Revenue Service. Although morality does play a role in the degree of truth imparted in the messages that we actually deliver, we also use a rational calculation of costs and benefits to decide whether or not to bend the truth. That lie may be worth it to us if the reward outweighs the punishment for getting caught— we are only human, after all.
But when animals communicate, we don't necessarily expect individuals to make decisions based on either moral standards o r societal rules. Rather, we expect the rules determining the honesty of a signal—or what researchers study- ing the topic call signal reliability to be imposed by natural selection, with costs and benefits ultimately measured in terms of relative reproductive success. How natural selection works to keep aiiimal signals reliable, and the nature of the outcome, is currently a central question in animal behavior.
Signal reliability poses a puzzle in many forms of animal communication, but the nature of tliis problem is perhaps most easily described by citing an example of aggressive signaling. Suppose two animals are vying for some resource, such as a particularly suitable nesting area, and that they are evenly matched in their fighting ability. Let's aLso assume that one of tliese two individuals values the piece of territory more and is therefore willing to fight harder to get it. If the animals resort to fighting, this more aggressive individual will win. Therefore, it seems efficient to settle the contest by signaling: Each individual conveys its true level of aggressiveness - that is, how hard it is willing to fight — and the less-aggressive individual concedes. The outcome is the same as if there had been a fight, but both individuals are spared the often painful price of an actual conflict.
This scenario sounds reasonable enough at first, except that it potentially creates a system that is vulnerable to cheating. If aggressive signals are effective in intimidating rivals, then individuals who exaggerate their aggressiveness will win contests that they would otherwise lose. Cheaters will benefit from their deception, cheating will be favored and spread in the population, and the signal will soon cease to correlate reliably with aggressiveness.
( William Searcy, Stephen )
www.ChordsAZ.com